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Abstract
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, deposits began to accumulate at
large Brazilian banks, representing a flight to safety away from small and medium-sized
banks. While total deposits in the Brazilian financial system grew by 13% from August 2008
to January 2009, the total deposits held by small and medium-sized banks declined by 23%
and 11%, respectively. Because of high statutory reserve requirements and legal
disincentives to lend directly to financial institutions, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) used
reserve requirements as its primary tool for providing liquidity to incentivize large banks to
provide credit to smaller banks, starting in October 2008. In October 2008, the BCB lowered
reserve requirements for all banks. It also increased eligibility thresholds, which released
some smaller banks from holding required reserves, provided voluntary deductions for large
banks that lent to smaller banks, and effectively mandated that large banks spread liquidity
to smaller banks. The BCB maintained these policies throughout the crisis and did not begin
raising reserve requirements until 2010. The BCB estimated that these actions released BRL
116 billion (USD 71 billion) of reserves into the system, or 4% of GDP. Most of the impact
was from increases in the deductions that banks could take from their requirements, rather
than from the headline cuts in reserve requirement ratios.
Keywords: Brazil, GFC, liquidity rules, reserve ratio, reserve requirements

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the adjustment of reserve requirements. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial
Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
In the leadup to the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC), Brazil stood out for setting high and
complex reserve requirements, as a leftover
of 1990s stabilization policy (OECD 2009).
The Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) had three
different types of requirements: ordinary
requirements that paid low or no interest,
extraordinary requirements that banks held
in cash with the central bank at the target
interest rate, and a government bondholding requirement against time deposits.3
The statutory reserve requirements were
quite high—the highest effective rate was
53%, applied to demand deposits, which
included 45% in ordinary reserves and 8%
in extraordinary cash reserves. However, the
BCB operated a system of deductions that
freed many small banks from holding any
required reserves at all (Robitaille 2011).
When the GFC worsened after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008,
deposits in the Brazilian financial system
began to accumulate among the largest
banks. Rather than a systemic leakage of
deposits out of Brazil, this represented a
“flight to safety” from small and mediumsized banks to large banks. From August
2008 to January 2009, total deposits grew
20% in large banks but fell 23% and 11% in
small and medium-sized banks, respectively
(Mesquita and Torós 2010).

Key Terms
Purpose of Adjusting Reserve Requirement (RR): to
counteract the significant decline in liquidity of the
financial system and to induce deposits from large
to smaller banks
Range of RR Ratio
(RRR) Peak-toTrough

53.0%–42.0%
(demand deposits)
30.0%–20.0%
(savings deposits)
8.0%–9.0%
(time deposits)

RRR Increase
Period

Not applicable

RRR Decrease
Period

September–December 2008

Legal Authority

Article 10(3) of Law 4575

Interest/
Remuneration on
Reserves

Selic (policy) rate, on two of
the three categories of
reserve assets

Notable Features

Most of the reserve impact
was from increases in the
deductions banks could take,
rather than the headline RRR
ratios
Many inducements to move
funds from large to smaller
banks

Outcomes

BRL 116 billion–
BRL 145 billion
(USD 71 billion–
USD 88 billion)
in reserves released

In response to this movement, the Central
Bank of Brazil (BCB) lowered many of its
reserve requirements as its “main liquidity
provision tool,” owing to the relatively high levels of required reserves and legal
disincentives to provide direct loans (Robitaille 2011, 30). The BCB also increased the
eligibility deductions to allow some banks to avoid holding required reserves. These actions
took place between September and December 2008.

3 Most

of the reserves held for the ordinary reserve requirement backed demand deposits and paid no interest.
Required reserves that backed savings deposits paid interest well below market rates (Robitaille 2011, 62).
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The BCB’s goal was to release reserves from large banks and build them at smaller banks.
The BCB required large banks to purchase loan portfolios of small and medium-sized banks
by forcing large banks to shift their reserves on time deposits from remunerated government
bond holdings to unremunerated cash (BCB 2008g). The BCB also employed other strategies
to release reserves from large banks, such as a deduction for prepaying contributions to the
deposit insurance fund that purchased loan portfolios, a deduction for foreign-exchange
swap purchases, and a deduction for (effectively) making loans to the government
development bank, BNDES.
See Figure 1 for a depiction of effective reserve requirement ratios in the Brazilian banking
system, with declines at the end of 2008, most notably on time deposits. In this instance,
effective reserve requirement ratios represent the actual level of required reserves held by
banks post-deductions. However, effective ratios still remained quite high compared to that
of most countries. Figure 2 summarizes the three types of reserve requirements applied to
the three types of deposits in 2008, along with the relevant deductible.
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Figure 1: Effective Reserve Requirement Ratios (%)

Note: The reserve requirements for demand, savings, and time deposits in the figure include both ordinary
requirements on demand and savings deposits and the government bond-holding requirement on all three
types of deposits. The extraordinary requirement is an additional requirement that the BCB required banks to
hold in cash (Robitaille 2011). For more details, see Key Design Decision No. 12, Changes in Reserve
Requirements. The dotted line represents the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, after which
the BCB began to adjust reserve requirements to promote liquidity.
Source: Cavalcanti and Vonbun 2013.
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Figure 2: Overview of Reserve Requirements
Reserve requirements: Mid-January 2008
Demand

Savings

Time

Deposits

Deposits

Deposits

Ordinary
(unremunerated cash
account)

45

20

0

44 million on demand
deposits, no deductible
for savings deposits

Extraordinary
(remunerated cash account)

8

10

8

100 million (applied to
the sum)

Government bond holdings

0

0

15

300 million

Type of Reserve

Deductible (BRL)

Reserve requirements: End-December 2008
Demand

Savings

Time

Deposits

Deposits

Deposits

Ordinary
(unremunerated cash
account)

42

20

9

44 million on demand
deposits, no deductible
for savings deposits

Extraordinary
(remunerated cash account)

0

0

0

None

Government bond holdings

5

10

10

2 billion

Type of Reserve

Deductible (BRL)

Source: Robitaille 2011.

Summary Evaluation
In a section on the BCB’s website explaining how it responded to the GFC, the BCB writes
that:
the existence of comfortable levels of required reserves allowed the BCB to inject
liquidity rapidly into the Brazilian banking system, contributing to a normalization of
credit conditions in the economy. (BCB n.d.b, author’s translation)
Prior to the GFC, banks held more than 250 billion reais (USD 153 billion) 4 in required
reserves at the BCB. By August 2009, required reserves would have totaled 295 billion reais
4

USD 1 = BRL 1.64 on September 1, 2008, according to Yahoo Finance.
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(BRL) under precrisis rules, according to BCB estimates. However, banks held only BRL 179
billion at that point, which implies that the measures taken by the BCB helped release BRL
116 billion in reserves, or 4% of GDP. In particular, the changes to the extraordinary cash
reserve requirement released BRL 42 billion, and the adjustments to the reserve
requirements applied to time deposits released BRL 62 billion (Mesquita and Torós 2010).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated the BCB’s
measures released BRL 145 billion in liquidity, ultimately concluding that most of the
reserves released into the system resulted from increases in the deductions that banks could
take from their requirements, rather than from the headline cuts in reserve requirement
ratios. The OECD calculated different breakdowns of liquidity released by the BCB. See Figure
3 for estimates relating to reserve requirement policy.
Figure 3: Estimated Liquidity Released by Reserve Requirement Adjustments
Reserve Requirement Adjustment

Estimate (BRL)

Shift from remunerated government bond reserve holdings
to unremunerated cash unless loan portfolios purchased

40.0 billion

Deductible increases

32.0 billion

Deduction of loan portfolio purchases (voluntary)

27.0 billion

Deduction of foreign-exchange swap purchases from
required reserves
Extraordinary requirement lowered for demand and time
deposits from 8% to 5%
Prepay contributions to deposit insurance fund for 60
months
Demand deposits reserve requirement held in
unremunerated cash lowered from 45% to 42%
Rural savings deposits reserve requirement held in
unremunerated cash lowered from 20% to 15%

19.0 billion
15.5 billion
5.5 billion
3.5 billion
2.5 billion

Source: OECD 2009.

In calculating its estimates, the OECD noted that the BCB allowed banks to deduct purchases
of foreign-exchange swaps from their required reserves—which the OECD estimated would
release BRL 19 billion of reserves—accounting for part of the difference in estimates made
by the OECD and Mesquita and Torós (OECD 2009).
According to the OECD in 2009, “the impact of the liquidity-boosting measures on longerterm credit creation is still unclear, but recent trends are encouraging” (OECD 2009, 26). One
of the issues limiting the effectiveness of lowering reserve requirements was the increase in
excess reserves placed at the BCB by banks. However, the OECD recommended that the BCB
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eliminate its high reserve requirements, as they tend to raise the costs of intermediation. The
OECD noted that reserve requirement policies had served as “useful instruments to manage
liquidity in periods of financial stress” (OECD 2009, 60).
Robitaille (2011, 36) states that, in general, the reserve requirement policy implemented by
the BCB during the GFC “does not appear to have been as successful as has been asserted” at
circulating liquidity from large banks to small and medium-sized banks. The author instead
claims that
direct and indirect assistance from government-owned or government-supported
entities played a more crucial role in alleviating funding pressures at that time.
(Robitaille 2011)
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The BCB adjusted reserve requirements to provide liquidity to the
banking system, especially for small and medium-sized banks.
In the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, capital flows to
emerging markets collapsed, causing funding pressure for Brazilian banks. During the week
of October 6, 2008, between BRL 30 billion and BRL 40 billion in deposits moved from small
and medium-sized banks to large banks that depositors viewed as safer (Romero and Ribeiro
2009). This represented 5.5% to 7.5% of total time deposits at the end of September
(Robitaille 2011).
According to the BCB’s description of its actions during the GFC,
the adopted measures by the government and the Central Bank of Brazil to mitigate the
effects of the domestic banking system crisis were aimed, principally, to counteract the
significant decrease in liquidity of the financial markets (BCB n.d.b, author’s translation).
The BCB’s approach to liquidity provision followed three main principles during the GFC,
according to a discussion paper that two BCB deputy governors published after the crisis: 1)
keep inflation converging to the target rate, 2) minimize the exposure of the BCB to the
private sector, and 3) avoid rewarding and encouraging moral hazard by private sector
actors. The deputy governors say that the GFC did not result in deposits leaving Brazil in a
systematic manner but rather led to a concentration of deposits among a few large
institutions. From August 2008 to January 2009, total deposits grew by 20% for large banks
while small and medium-sized banks’ deposits declined by 23% and 11%, respectively
(Mesquita and Torós 2010).5 Through its reserve requirement policy changes, the BCB
attempted to reverse this accumulation of deposits among the largest banks of Brazil.
2. Part of a Package: Reserve requirements were the main tool available to the BCB
for liquidity provision, as financial institutions were reluctant to borrow from the
BCB because of the perception of significant public oversight and stigma.
Prior to the GFC, Brazilian banks began to draw on a type of funding that they called termed
repo but which functioned effectively as time deposits. These transactions allowed banks to
avoid time deposit reserve requirements. In early 2008, the BCB announced that it would set
high reserve requirements for termed repos, effectively tightening reserve requirements.
However, the BCB delayed the implementation of this policy during the GFC. The delay in
effect loosened reserve requirements during the crisis (Robitaille 2011).
In an attempt to provide liquidity to smaller financial institutions, the Brazilian deposit
insurance fund (FGC) purchased loan portfolios of smaller banks (OECD 2009). At the start
of the crisis, the FGC had only two full-time employees and only BRL 2.5 billion in lending
5

Total overall deposits in the system grew by 13% during this period.
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capacity. Therefore, the BCB allowed banks to prepay up to 60 months of their required
contributions to the FGC and deduct that from their unremunerated cash reserves held on
demand deposits. According to Robitaille (2011), the FGC received BRL 5.4 billion in
prepayments, implying an equivalent release of BRL 5.4 billion in reserves.
To enhance liquidity in foreign-exchange markets, the BCB also allowed banks to deduct
purchases of foreign-exchange swaps from their required reserves, which the OECD
estimated would release BRL 19 billion of reserves (OECD 2009).
Although banks could also turn to the discount window, doing so posed a stigma problem.
The BCB itself described approaching the discount window prior to 1996 as “tantamount to
being almost insolvent for a financial institution” (BCB 1999, 78). Since 1996, the BCB made
several changes to the discount window to destigmatize it, through easing terms and
widening eligibility. The BCB also improved the discount window’s legal and operational
frameworks during the GFC to make it a more appealing source of liquidity for banks.
Nonetheless, the discount window was unused during the GFC (Mesquita and Torós 2010).
3. Legal Authority: The BCB had significant flexibility in setting reserve
requirements according to the law that established the framework.
Law 4595 of 1964, which established the framework of the Brazilian financial system,
granted the BCB the ability to establish reserve requirements (Robitaille 2011). Law 7730 of
1989, amending Law 4595, allowed the BCB to vary reserve requirements based on
geographic regions, “the priorities attributed to the investments,” and type of financial
institution (Morris 1964, sec. 10). Law 7730 specifically permits the BCB to lower reserve
requirements on funds that are reinvested in agricultural financing with favorable terms
(Casa Civil 1964).
Law 7730 permits the BCB to apply up to a 100% reserve requirement on demand deposits
and up to 60% on other financial instruments. The law also states that the BCB can decide
for the reserves to be held in cash or government debt and allows the BCB to determine if
the reserves are remunerated or not (Casa Civil 1964).
At the time the government passed these laws, the BCB used reserve requirements as its
main method of providing liquidity to the financial system. BCB officials said political
pressure and scrutiny from the National Congress and the public discouraged its use of
traditional lender-of-last-resort policy. The BCB, at the time, was not a formally independent
institution, and officials at the BCB were liable for their actions for up to five years upon
leaving office. Robitaille (2011, 29) found multiple examples of central bank officials facing
investigations and public criticism prior to the GFC, stating that “the threat of legal action
continues to be taken seriously.”
In the wake of a banking crisis in the late 1990s, the Brazilian National Congress passed a
Fiscal Responsibility Law in 2000 that imposed limits on the BCB’s ability to lend to the
financial sector (Robitaille 2011). This legislation barred the BCB from using public money
to “rescue” financial institutions, unless the National Congress passed “specific laws”
authorizing it (Congresso Nacional 2000, art. 28). This legislation allowed the BCB to provide
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“discount window operations and loans with maturities with less than 360 days to financial
institutions” (Congresso Nacional 2000, art. 28). However, despite this carve-out for the
discount window, the BCB remained hesitant to use it. Therefore, changing reserve
requirements became the main tool for liquidity provision during the GFC.
4. Administration: The BCB administered all changes to the RRR.
The BCB administered changes to the RRR.
5. Governance: The National Monetary Council sets reserve requirements, although
the BCB uses its agenda-setting role to drive decision-making.
According to Law 4595, the National Monetary Council (CMN) had the authority to set
reserve requirements. The CMN had the following members at the time: the Minister of State
for Finance; the Minister of State for Planning, Budget and Management; and the President
of the BCB (Casa Civil 1964). The BCB is the Secretariat of the CMN and establishes its agenda,
which gives the central bank significant influence over its decisions (Costa de Moura and
Bandeira 2017).
According to the Romero and Ribeiro (2009) oral history of the crisis, on October 10, 2008,
two senior BCB officials—the Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy and the head of banking
operations—worked together to determine which reserve requirements to change and how
those tweaks would benefit individual banks. Work at the BCB continued around the clock
throughout the weekend, with the BCB announcing on Monday, October 13 that it would
change reserve requirements to release BRL 100 billion in reserves (Romero and Ribeiro
2009). Research did not determine external oversight of reserve requirement policy.
No Brazilian agency had an explicit financial stability mandate, but the BCB acted on a de
facto mandate to monitor financial stability. As the Secretariat of the CMN, the BCB “heavily
influences the design and structure of macroprudential policy,” as well as designed many of
the policy instruments (Costa de Moura and Bandeira 2017, 78). Specifically, staffers at the
BCB stated that “the BCB and CMN are jointly responsible for the management of
macroprudential instruments including . . . reserve requirement ratios” (Costa de Moura and
Bandeira 2017, 78).
6. Communication: The BCB announced changes in reserve requirements through
public circulars.
The BCB announced changes to the reserve requirements through public circulars.
The day before the BCB announced a reserve requirement change on October 13, 2008, the
President of the BCB met with the heads of the major banks in Brazil to request that they
continue to use the interbank market, especially for small and medium-sized banks (Romero
and Ribeiro 2009).
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7. Assets Qualifying as Reserves: The BCB required banks to hold reserves in
unremunerated cash, remunerated cash, and remunerated government bonds.
The BCB’s reserve requirements had to be fulfilled by three categories of assets:
unremunerated cash (ordinary reserves), remunerated cash (extraordinary reserves), and
government bond holdings. Article 10(3) of Law 4595 gave the BCB the authority to require
reserves to take the form of cash and government securities (Casa Civil 1964). The two
categories of cash reserves were kept at the BCB in reserve accounts (Robitaille 2011).
According to Robitaille (2011, 18), there did not appear to be many limitations on what
constituted “government bond holdings,” so long as they were marketable. This included
fixed-rate, floating-rate, and consumer price index-chained government securities.
8. Reservable Liabilities: The BCB applied various RRRs to time, demand, and
savings deposits.
As noted in Key Design Decision No. 12, Changes in Reserve Requirements, the BCB applied
different ratios to different deposit types, with relatively high rates applied to demand and
savings deposits (45.0% and 20.0%, respectively). Partly for this reason, time deposits have
been the most important source of domestic funding for Brazilian banks since the 1990s
(Robitaille 2011).6
9. Computation: The BCB used a half-lagged or lagged measure, depending on
deposit type, to average the RRR across a maintenance period of one to two weeks.
The BCB based reserve requirements on the average levels of liabilities over a maintenance
period; it did not implement a marginal reserve requirement during the crisis. The BCB
maintenance period was one to two weeks and the BCB used a half-lagged to lagged
accounting measure, both depending on the type of deposit. In a lagged system, the
maintenance period does not overlap with the calculation period, while the two periods
overlap under a half-lagged system. The lagged system allows banks to know for certain the
level of required reserves ahead of time but delays the implementation of changes to reserve
requirements by a week or two (Montoro and Moreno 2011; Robitaille 2011).
10. Eligible Institutions: All banks are required to hold reserves; during the crisis, the
BCB expanded the existing deductions for small and medium-sized banks.
Although the BCB set high statutory reserve ratios prior to the GFC, deductions allowed small
and medium-size banks to maintain much lower effective reserve ratios.
For the ordinary reserve requirement on demand deposits, banks could deduct BRL 44
million from their reserve requirement prior to the GFC. In effect, banks with less than BRL

6 The BCB required banks to lend 27% of demand deposits to the agriculture sector and 65% of savings deposits

to the housing sector (Robitaille 2011, 17).
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98 million in demand deposits did not have to hold required reserves. The BCB did not
change this deductible during the GFC (Robitaille 2011).
For the extraordinary reserve requirement, banks could deduct BRL 100 million from the
sum of reserves held on time, demand, and savings deposits prior to the GFC (Robitaille
2011). In effect, banks were exempt from the extraordinary reserve requirement if their
ordinary reserves on time, demand, and savings deposits were less than BRL 100 million.
The BCB raised this deductible to BRL 300 million on September 24 (BCB 2008a), BRL 700
million on October 8 (BCB 2008c), and BRL 1 billion on October 13 (BCB 2008d). See Figure
7 for an overview of these changes.
For the government bonds held in reserve against time deposits, banks could deduct BRL
300 million prior to the GFC. The BCB raised this deductible to BRL 700 million on October
8 (BCB 2008c) and BRL 2 billion on October 13 (BCB 2008d). See Figure 8 for an overview
of these changes.
According to Robitaille (2011), only 41 out of 101 Brazilian banks held required reserves in
December 2007. The remaining banks were smaller than the eligibility thresholds
established by the deductibles.
11. Timing: The BCB adhered to a separation principle in which it did not change the
target policy rate, the Selic, during the reserve requirement adjustments.
The BCB adhered to a “separation principle,” in which it used separate tools to implement
monetary policy and liquidity provision (Mesquita and Torós 2010). As can be seen in Figure
4, the BCB raised the Selic rate, the target policy rate, in the leadup to the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. However, after Lehman failed, the BCB eased reserve
requirements to provide liquidity to the financial system. The BCB held the Selic rate
constant during that period and only lowered it in 2009 after it stopped adjusting reserve
requirements.
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Figure 4: Selic Rate (%, daily)

Note: Dotted line represents the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008.
Source: BCB n.d.a.

12. Changes in Reserve Requirements: The BCB made changes to the three types of
reserve requirements to promote liquidity flows from larger banks to smaller and
medium-sized banks.
The BCB had three types of reserve requirements: ordinary requirements that paid low or
no interest, extraordinary requirements that banks held in cash with the central bank at the
target interest rate, and a government bond-holding requirement against time deposits
(Robitaille 2011). Each of these categories will be discussed individually. See Figure 5 for an
overview of the reserve requirements prior to the GFC.
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Figure 5: Reserve Requirements in Mid-January 2008 (%)
Demand
Deposits

Savings
Deposits

Time
Deposits

Unremunerated
cash account

45

20

0

44 million on demand and no
deductible for savings deposits

Remunerated
cash account

8

10

8

100 million (applied to the sum)

Government bond
holdings

0

0

15

300 million

Type of Reserve

Deductible (BRL)

Source: Robitaille 2011.

Ordinary Reserve Requirement
The BCB maintained high reserve ratios that had to be kept as unremunerated reserves. Precrisis, eligible institutions had to hold ordinary reserves to cover 45% of their demand
deposits and 20% of their savings deposits (Robitaille 2011). On October 14, 2008, the BCB
lowered the rate on demand deposits to 42% (BCB 2008f). This released about BRL 3.5
billion in reserves (OECD 2009). The BCB did not change this ratio for the remainder of the
crisis period. The BCB never made a change to the reserve requirement for savings deposits
during the crisis period.7
The BCB also introduced a quasi-statutory reserve requirement on time deposits, which is
discussed in Key Design Decision No. 14, Other Restrictions. In effect, the BCB forced eligible
institutions to move their time deposit reserves from government bonds to unremunerated
reserves unless they provided liquidity to smaller banks in the financial system (Robitaille
2011). See Figure 6 for an overview of the changes applied to the unremunerated reserve
requirement set by the BCB.

However, the BCB did decrease the requirement for savings deposits of rural banks to 15% on October 30
(Cavalcanti and Vonbun 2013). The OECD estimated that this released BRL 2.5 billion (OECD 2009).
7
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Figure 6: Reserve Requirement Changes to Unremunerated Reserves in 2008
Date
Announced

Date
Effective

Pre-crisis

Demand
Deposits

Savings
Deposits

Time
Deposits

Deductible (BRL)

45

20

0

44 million on deposits

October 14

October 29

42

-

-

-

October 24

October 24

-

-

-

-

October 30

November 14

-

-

10.5

-

December
19

January 5

-

-

9

-

Note: Red text indicates quasi-statutory ratios due to the other conditions applied by the BCB. A hyphen
represents no change from the previous circular.
Source: Robitaille 2011.

Extraordinary Reserve Requirement
Prior to the GFC, the BCB also had an extraordinary reserve requirement. It required eligible
institutions to hold cash reserves with the central bank to cover 8% of demand deposits,
10% of savings deposits, and 8% of time deposits. On October 8, 2008, the BCB lowered the
requirements for both demand and time deposits to 5% (BCB 2008c). This released an
estimated BRL 15.5 billion in reserves (OECD 2009). Also, on November 13, the BCB required
banks to hold their reserves for the extraordinary requirement against all three types of
deposits in government bonds rather than cash with the central bank (BCB 2008h).
According to Robitaille (2011), banks preferred to hold government bonds rather than cash
because the BCB allowed them the intra-day discretion to deviate from the requirement in
order to manage liquidity. See Figure 7 for an overview of the changes applied to the
extraordinary cash requirement, as well as Figure 1 for a graphical representation.

353

Brazil

Fulmer

Figure 7: Reserve Requirement Changes to the Extraordinary Cash Requirement in
2008
Date
Announced

Date
Effective

Pre-crisis

Demand
Deposits

Savings
Deposits

Time
Deposits

8

10

8

Deductible (BRL)
applied to the sum of deposits
100 million

September 24

September 29

-

-

-

300 million

October 8

October 10

-

-

-

700 million

October 8

October 13

5

-

5

-

October 13

October 13

-

-

-

1,000 million

November 13

December 1

0

0

0

None

Note: A hyphen represents no change from the previous circular.
Source: Robitaille 2011.

Government Bond Holding Requirement
Prior to the crisis, the BCB required eligible institutions to hold government bonds backing
15% of their time deposits (Robitaille 2011). On October 30, 2008, this effectively dropped
to 4.5% when the BCB forced banks to shift their reserves from remunerated government
bonds to unremunerated cash reserves (BCB 2008g). This increased to a quasi-statutory
ratio of 6% on December 19, 2008, as the BCB allowed banks to keep a greater amount of
time deposit reserves in government bond holdings (BCB 2008i). The details of this action
are discussed in more detail in Key Design Decision No. 14, Other Restrictions. As mentioned
previously, the BCB shifted the cash holding component of the extraordinary requirement to
government bond holdings on November 13, 2008. See Figure 8 for an overview of the
changes applied to the government bond holding requirement.
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Figure 8: Reserve Requirement Changes to Government Bond Holding Requirement in
2008
Date
Announced

Date
Effective

Pre-crisis

Demand
Deposits

Savings
Deposits

Time
Deposits

0

0

15

Deductible (BRL)
300 million

October 8

October 10

-

-

-

700 million

October 13

October 17

-

-

-

2,000 million

October 30

November 14

-

-

4.5

-

November 13

December 1

5

10

9.5

-

December 19

January 16

-

-

10

-

Note: Red text indicates quasi-statutory ratios due to the other conditions applied by the BCB. A hyphen
represents no change from the previous circular.
Source: Robitaille 2011.

According to Montoro and Moreno (2011), Brazil did not apply any reserve requirements to
non-BRL assets.
13. Changes in Interest/Remuneration: The BCB remunerated some required
reserves, and the BCB considered lowering remuneration if large banks did not
spread liquidity to smaller banks.
Ordinary reserves paid low or no interest. Extraordinary cash reserves and government
bond holdings earned the Selic rate, the BCB’s target policy rate.
Most ordinary cash that banks held as required reserves backed demand deposits and paid
no interest. Required reserves that backed savings deposits did pay interest, albeit at a rate
much lower than the Selic rate, considered well below market rates (Robitaille 2011).
The BCB also considered reducing the rate of remuneration on extraordinary cash reserves
but ultimately did not do so, according to a newspaper article on October 20, 2008. President
Lula criticized banks that placed surplus funds overnight with the BCB to receive interest
rather than circulating the funds to other banks in the financial system. As noted in Key
Design Decision No. 14, Other Restrictions, the BCB created a voluntary deduction to
encourage banks to leave their surplus funds with other banks (D’Amorim 2008).
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14. Other Restrictions: The BCB implemented both voluntary and mandatory
deductions to encourage large banks to spread their liquidity throughout the
Brazilian financial system.
The BCB attempted to alleviate funding pressures on small and medium-sized banks by
extending reserve requirement deductions. On October 2, 2008, the BCB allowed banks to
deduct up to 40% of their government bond holding requirement against time deposits
through the purchase of loan portfolios from small and medium-sized banks, institutions
with less than BRL 2.5 billion in Tier 1 capital (88 out of 103 banks) (BCB 2008b). On October
13, the BCB increased this deduction to 70% and expanded eligibility to banks with less than
BRL 7 billion in Tier 1 capital (97 out of 103 banks) (BCB 2008e). This policy effectively
incentivized the largest six banks to deduct loan portfolio purchases from the remaining 97
banks. With this deduction, the BCB attempted to voluntarily shift reserves from large banks
to smaller banks. The OECD estimated this released BRL 27 billion in reserves (OECD 2009).
However, the speed of loan portfolio purchases seemingly did not satisfy the BCB or
President Lula (Robitaille 2011). The BCB announced on October 30, 2008, that banks had
to shift 70% of their government bond holding requirement, which was remunerated, to
unremunerated cash reserves unless they extended credit to smaller banks. This
announcement in effect removed the voluntary aspect of the scheme through a negative cost
incentive (BCB 2008g). As a result, it created a quasi-statutory reserve requirement for time
deposits on unremunerated reserves at 10.5%, that is, 70% of the 15% government-bond
holding requirement on time deposits, for banks that did not extend credit to smaller banks;
they could hold the remaining 4.5% in government bonds (Robitaille 2011). There had
previously not been a reserve requirement applied to time reserves that had to be held in
unremunerated reserves (Robitaille 2011). The BCB decreased this shift to 60% on
December 19, lowering the quasi-statutory ratio to 9% (BCB 2008i).
The BCB allowed the large banks to place funds with smaller banks in unsecured overnight
interbank deposits, known as CDIs, to count as loan portfolio purchases. This freed up the
purchasing banks from inspecting and assessing complicated loan portfolios. Additionally,
the Circular regarding CDIs did not establish a minimum term, allowing large banks to
continuously roll over the CDIs. Therefore, this essentially served as a loan (Robitaille 2011).
The BCB created another deduction on November 25 that banks could use to lessen the
unremunerated reserve requirements on time deposits. Large banks could deduct purchased
CDIs from BNDES from their reserve requirements, the government development bank, in
effect lending to the government. The BNDES then channeled these funds to the non-financial
sector. BNDES could issue up to BRL 6 billion of CDIs with maturities from 6 to 18 months.
Within a year, the interbank liabilities of BNDES increased from 0 to BRL 5.4 billion
(Robitaille 2011).
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15. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The BCB did not specify the impacts of
reserve requirement policy on monetary policy.
The BCB followed the “separation principle,” in which it used separate tools for monetary
policy and liquidity provision.
16. Duration: In its public statements, the BCB did not include an end date for its
reserve requirement during the GFC.
The BCB did not preannounce end dates for the reserve requirement changes it made during
the GFC. The changes were not permanent, as the BCB later raised reserve requirements and
deductions after the GFC.
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